What we found, what we did, what changed.

Growth had stalled. Two months of evidence said why.

The situation

An established software vendor with a strong product, a loyal customer base and growth that had flattened. Leadership had theories about the cause but no evidence, and a US expansion on the table with no clear basis for the decision.

What we did

A two-month, fixed-scope diagnostic across both halves of the system. On the sales and marketing side, a full review of internal capability — people, process, pipeline, positioning. Outside the building, structured interviews with current customers to find where the product was winning and where accounts were at risk, and with lost customers to hear, in their words, why they'd left. For the US question, we brought in Deep Analysis, a US specialist in the vendor's category, to ground the expansion case in market reality rather than ambition.

What it found

Where growth had gone wrong, and why the current motion was stalling — specific enough to act on. Which accounts were at risk and what would keep them. What the US market would actually require. All of it in one strategy the leadership team could take to the board.

Where it stands

The client has engaged Sales-Logic and Full Signal to execute the strategy. That's the result we'd point to: a diagnostic worth paying for is one the client wants to act on with the people who wrote it.

A sales environment that wasn't working, rebuilt from the method up.

The situation

An experienced partner with a capable team and a pipeline that didn't convert. No shared sales method — each BDM sold their own way. Pipeline reviews were status updates. The forecast was whatever the team felt good about. Deals were being lost to no decision after demos that had "gone well".

What we did

Implemented a single sales methodology, trained the team on it and coached it into use deal by deal: discovery that quantifies the cost of doing nothing, demos structured around the prospect's problem, a pre-proposal review before pricing goes out. Took on the sales-management overlay — weekly pipeline inspection, one-on-ones, forecast. Then, because method alone wasn't enough, began restructuring the sales environment itself: roles, coverage, how presales and sales work together.

Where it stands

The pipeline is inspected weekly against evidence rather than narrated. The team runs a method it didn't have. The structure is being rebuilt for growth, with the team expected to expand. Revenue results are still landing, and we'll publish them when they're real rather than early. What we can say now is what the owner can see: which deals are genuine, which aren't, and why.

We built the direct-sales engine. The evidence said sell through partners.

The situation

A vendor that had grown through partners and wanted to know whether a direct sales function could grow it faster. A new BDM had been hired to find out.

What we did

Built the full direct-sales engine from nothing: ICP, process, methodology, playbooks in the CRM, demo structure, pipeline rhythms. Coached the BDM through it week by week.

What it found

Six months in, the evidence was clear. The direct motion wasn't producing what the partner channel produced, and the person in the seat wasn't built for it. The founder made the call to return to partner-only sales and put the investment there.

Where it stands

That was the right decision, and we said so. The engagement's value was a question answered with evidence in six months instead of a hunch carried for two years. We'd rather publish that than pretend every build ends in a growth curve — and if the answer had been different, the engine was ready.